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The Doctrine of Robin Hood
A Note on "Substantive Consolidation"
Sabin Willett*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Outside of Chapter 11, corporations are jealous of their distinct
place on the earth. When a pedestrian slips on the terrazzo slab of its
affiliate, your usual red-blooded corporation stoutly denies responsibility for the orthopedist's bill. In the corporation's view, Cain had it
right.' The state courts too will generally assume that Cain, Inc. is a
very different person than Abelco, the special-purpose subsidiary that
owns the offending slab. The two may share an address, a board of
directors, and a slate of officers, yet the state courts will depart from
the proposition that Cain, Inc. is responsible for Abelco's debts2 only3
where in practical effect Abelco and Cain amount to the same entity.
While this equitable leavening seems a logical exercise of state power
(it is states, after all, that create corporations in the first place), one
thing is sure: in the rough and tumble of corporate life east of Eden,
corporations will resist it.
How bracing the change when we reach the Paradise of Chapter 11!
Now it is Cain, Inc. itself (it, Abelco and 87 affiliates filed voluntary
petitions for relief) that urges the court to ignore corporate niceties.
* The author, of Bingham McCutchen LLP, is indebted to his partner Guy B. Moss, our
firm's dean of the law of substantive consolidation, as well as to Douglas G. Baird, Harry A.
Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School, whose excellent
article, Substantive Consolidation Today was published in the materials of the April 22, 2005
American College of Bankruptcy Symposium on the Future of Chapter 11, and anticipates many
of the themes of this note, and to the much-lamented Eleanor Heard Gilbane, Esq., an associate
recently departed from Bingham McCutchen to points south.
1. "Then the Lord said to Cain, 'Where is Abel your brother?' He said, 'I do not know; am I
my brother's keeper?"' Genesis 4:09.
2. "Notwithstanding the fact that two corporations may be extremely interrelated, each is
deemed to have an independent existence." WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,

§25 (2005). A parent corporation does

not lose the benefits of limited liability by taking an active interest in the affairs of its subsidiary,
using voting power, and entering into contracts with the subsidiary. See generally Nat'l Labor
Relations Board v. Int'l Measurement & Control Co., 978 F. 2d 334 (7th Cir. 1992).
3. The :orporate entity must be observed unless unusual conditions exist which require the
courts to look behind the form to the substance. See Diamond Chem. Co. v. Atafina Chemicals,
268 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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In bankruptcy this is called "substantive consolidation." It is a bankruptcy power few question. Yet no statute authorizes it, and almost
nothing in the old books justifies the many modern boasts of an ancient lineage. Prior to August, 2005, when the Third Circuit decided
In re Owens Corning,4 the opinions on the doctrine were in the main
addled, and their wooly-minded discussions of "balancing of equities"
and "net benefits to creditors" vexed the lawyer's effort to give practical advice to a client. In at last announcing an intelligible test, the
Third Circuit has taken a step forward. As we will see, the path it has
set out on may lead courts not to an answer but to a question: was
there ever anything legitimate about the doctrine in the first place?

II.

WHAT IS SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION?

Substantive consolidation "merges the assets and liabilities of the
debtor entities into a unitary debtor estate to which all holders of allowed claims are required to look for distribution. ' 5 It is a "device,"
as one commentator puts it: "Creditors seek substantive consolidation
to enhance their position by corralling unencumbered assets of other
related entities."'6 Corralling unencumbered assets - they used to
shoot horse thieves for that.
Why substantively consolidate? Do the math. "[C]reditors of a
debtor whose asset-to-liability ratio is higher than that of its affiliated
debtor must lose to the extent that the asset-to-liability ratio of the
merged estates will be lower."'7 Suppose Abelco and Cain, Inc. each
has $100 of assets. Abelco has 100 creditors, each holding an allowed
claim of $1. Cain, Inc. has 200 creditors, each holding an allowed
claim of $1. (We are still in Paradise - there are no administrative
expenses.) In separate reorganizations, Abelco creditors will receive
100-cent distributions, while Cain, Inc. creditors will receive 50 cents.
If the estates are substantively consolidated, 300 holders of $1 allowed
claims will pool to receive $200 of value. The Cain, Inc. creditors improve their distribution by 17 cents, while the Abelco's lose 33.
Courts may consolidate cases of artificial persons, like corporations,
4. 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005).
5. In re Hemingway Transp., Inc. et al., 954 F.2d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1992); See also In re Augie/
Restivo Baking Co., Ltd., 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988) (substantive consolidation of two
debtors usually results in "pooling the assets of, and claims against, the two entities; satisfying
liabilities from the resulting common fund; eliminating inter-company claims; and combining the
creditors of the two companies ...").
6. JAMES F. QUEENAN, JR. ET AL., CHAPTER 11 THEORY AND PRACTICE: A
GUIDE TO REORGANIZATION § 24.01 (4th ed. 1994).
7. In re Snider Brothers et al., 18 B.R. 230, 234 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
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with those of natural persons; 8 indeed, courts may consolidate estates
of debtors and non-debtors, thus asserting wholesale power over assets and liabilities alike of entities existing under state law. 9 The zerosum principle always holds true: when estates are substantively consolidated, the rich are taxed to benefit the poor. The doctrine of substantive consolidation is thus the doctrine of Robin Hood.
Different courts regard this economic fact with different levels of
concern. To the Ninth Circuit, it is not troubling, or even relevant. In
In re Bonham, creditors of the corporation to be consolidated objected that the bankruptcy court failed to measure the particular harm
to them. "The investors cite to no authority that requires any sort of
cost-benefit analysis. Rather, substantive consolidation is premised
on a sole aim: fairness to all creditors, and not on any formalistic cost
benefit analysis." 10 Other decisions, including Owens Corning, note
that the "rough justice" of the remedy makes it appropriate only
rarely and as a last resort." "Equality among creditors who have lawfully bargained for different treatment is not equity but its opposite,"
as Judge Friendly once put it.12 The note returns to this divergence in
section III.
III.

THE ROOTS OF SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION DOCTRINE

A.

Section 105(a)

A confident jurisprudence traces the doctrine to equitable ancestry.
We are told that Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code ("Code") is
the lawful heir and assign of section 2(a)(15) of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898 ("Act"), under which courts had identified the equitable power
13
of the bankruptcy court substantively to consolidate.
8. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Colonial Realty et al., 966 F.2d 57, 57 (2d Cir. 1992); In re
Baker & Getty Fin. Serv., Inc. et al., 78 B.R. 139 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986).
9. In re Bonham et al., 229 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 2000) (consolidating estate of individual with
two non-debtor corporations); In re United Stairs Corp., 176 B.R. 359, 368 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995)
(consolidating nondebtor entities with debtor); In re Munford, Inc., 115 BR. 390, 397-98 (Bankr.
N.D.G A.1990) (method of bringing non-debtor's assets into a debtor's estate); In re Crabtree,
39 B.R. 718, 723 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984). A few courts have held that nondebtors may not be
substantively consolidated. In re Julien Co., 120 B.R. 930, 937-38 (Bankr. W. D. Tenn. 1990); In
re DRW Property Co. 82, 54 B.R. 489 (Bankr N.D. Tex. 1985).
10. In re Bonham, 229 F.3d at 767 n. 12 (citing to F.D.I.C. v. Colonial Realty, 966 F.2d 57, 61
(2d Cir. 1992)).
11. 419 F.3d at 211; see also In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F. 2d at 519 (2d Cir. 1988).
12. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. Kheel and Scully, 369 F.2d 845, 848 (2d Cir. 1966)
(Talk is cheap. Judge Friendly was concurring in a judgment upholding substantive
consolidation).
13. See In re Bonham, 229 F.3d at 763; Parkway Calabasas Ltd., 89 B.R. 832, 837 n. 4 (Bankr.
C.D. Calif. 1988), afftd, 949 F.2d 1058 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Before turning to the Act precedents, a word or two of caution
about Section 105(a) is appropriate. It is not a "roving commission to
do equity.

where. 15

' 14

It enables only those rights that are validly created else-

To begin with the easiest proposition, the section cannot be

16
used to contradict a plain statutory right.
One might plausibly argue that substantive consolidation does indeed contradict plain terms in the Code. Code definitions incorporate

state law to tell us who may be a debtor. For example, a "corporation" may be a debtor, but a corporation is purely a creature of state
law, and may be a debtor only when lawfully existing as a function of
that law. 17 The Code, in turn, makes clear that a case under title 11

may be commenced by or in respect of a single such entity. 18 The

"creditors" in a Chapter 11 case are the holders of claims against that

entity (i.e., that singular creature of state or federal law). 19
In Chapter 7 cases, the claims of creditors are to be satisfied, if at
all, from "property of the estate, '20 and "property of the estate" is
itself defined by reference to that singular debtor. The estate consists
of: "interests of the debtor [i.e. that singular entity again, not some

other entity] in property;"'21 property the trustee recovers under enumerated statutes;22 and certain property acquired by the debtor after
the case commences.2 3 Congress was excruciatingly specific about

those occasions when property of the estate was to include property of
someone other than the debtor. Subsection (a)(2) of Section 541

sweeps in certain property interests of the debtor's spouse. Subsections (a)(6) and (7) make certain kinds of property generated by the
14. Mirant Corp. v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 378 F.3d 511, 523 (5th Cir. 2004).
15. See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2004) (Section 105(a) does not
support "critical vendor" relief; power conferred in the section is to implement rather than override express bankruptcy provisions).
16. ATD Corp. v. Advantage Packaging, Inc. (In re ATD Corp.), 352 F.3d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir.
2003) (stating that Section 105(a) cannot be used to require the filing of a claim whose filing a
code provision exempts); Noonan v. Secretary of Health & Human Services (In re Ludlow
Hosp. Soc'y, Inc.), 124 F. 3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that Section 105(a) cannot extend
deadlines in contravention of Section 108); Diamond & Gold Connection, Inc. v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co. (In re Diamond & Gold Connection, Inc.), 54 B.R. 917, 919 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1985) (stating that Section 105 cannot be used to revive expired contracts).
17. Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Forty-One-Thirty-Six Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 127
(1937); In re Vermont Fiberglass, Inc., 38 B.R. 151, 153 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984).
18. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2005) (case commenced by petition filed by "entity" but not "entities"); id. § 101(15) (entity includes a "person" but not "persons"); id. § 101(41) ("person" includes a "corporation" but not "corporations").
19. Id. § 101(10).
20. See id. § 704(1).
21. Id. § 541(a)(1).
22. Id. § 541(a)(3).
23. Id. § 541(a)(5).
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estate itself "property of the estate:" that is, certain proceeds, profits
25

and the like, 24 and all property later acquired by the estate itself.
Thus, allowing estate property to be distributed to persons other than

holders of claims against and interests in the debtor contradicts an
elaborate and precise Code architecture. If substantive consolidation
26
contradicts the Code, surely it cannot be enabled by Section 105(a).
It may be argued that Chapter 11 differs from Chapter 7. Nothing

in Chapter 11 says what property may be used to satisfy creditor
claims in a plan. That property might well include property that is not

"property of the estate:" proceeds of the issuance of new securities,
for example. Even so, Section 105(a) remains problematic as a source

of authority for an equitable power to substantively consolidate bankruptcy estates. This is because many decisions say that the "rights"
Section 105 enables must be statutory, and there is no such right of

substantive consolidation in the Code. 27 The terms of the statute itself
speak of "effectuating the provisions of this title." Section 105(a) is
mortar, not bricks. Unless Congress somewhere provided for substantive consolidation, Section 105(a) cannot be used to create it.
B.

Section 1123(a)(5)

Some see a brick in Section 1123(a)(5)(C), which provides that a
plan may include, as a means for its own implementation, the "merger
or consolidation of the debtor with one or more persons. '28 This section is authority for substantive consolidation according to Stone &
29
Webster, Inc., and other decisions.

Using Section 1123(a)(5)(C) as support for substantive consolidation is a strange argument, for on its face Section 1123(a) seems rather
to list the laundry than to make alterations. The debtor may retain all
33
of its property, 30 sell some or all of it,31 merge, 32 amend its charter,
24. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (2005).
25. Id. § 541(a)(7).
26. At least one Second Circuit panel has sniffed at this argument. "Neither the Code, its
legislative history, nor the logic which orders any linguistic interpretation, provides any real support for this argument." F.D.I.C. v. Colonial Realty Co., 966 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1992).
27. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988); Jamo v. Katahdin Federal
Credit Union (In re Jamo), 283 F.3d 392, 403 (1st Cir. 2002) (authority bestowed by Section 105
may be invoked only where "the equitable remedy dispensed by the court is necessary to preserve an identifiable right conferred elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code." emphasis added); see
Mirant Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co. (In re Mirant Corp.), 378 F.3d 511, 523 (5th Cir. 2004).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(C) (2005).
29. 286 B.R. 532, 540-44 (Bankr. D. Del., 2002); In re Affiliated Foods, Inc., 249 B.R. 770, 777
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2000); In re Limited Gaming of America, Inc., 228 B.R. 275, 287 (Bankr. N.D.
Okla. 1988).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(A) (2005).
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issue securities, 34 or engage in other activities. There is no suggestion

that any of these references dispense with requirements that otherwise
would apply to a sale of assets, the amendment of a charter, or the

issuance of securities. All indications point the other way. For example, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that Congress did not intend Section
1123(a) to permit asset transfers in violation of state laws regulating
utilities. 35 We know the debtor may issue securities without registering them under the securities laws only because Congress enacted Section 1145.36

Subsection (E) is similar. It provides that a plan may provide for
the "satisfaction or modification of any lien." Other statutes lay out
the requirements for satisfaction and modification of liens. 37 No one
thinks that Section 1123 adds to or subtracts anything from the substantive rights of lienholders. It just tells us that lien treatment can be
tucked into a plan. Thus Professor Baird calls the section a "thin reed

to justify substantive consolidation," and it seems that he has the better of the argument. 38 There is no statutory brick for which Section
105 may act as mortar.
C.

The Case Antecedents for Substantive Consolidation

Despite these considerable problems, there is overwhelming circuit-

court support for the existence of judicial power of substantive consolidation under title 11. 39 As noted above, the usual rationale is that
Section 105(a) codified an Act provision which itself imported equitable doctrines recognized under the Act.40 In Bonham, the Ninth Circuit held that bankruptcy courts had general equitable power under
31. Id. § 1123(a)(5)(B).
32. Id. § 1123(a)(5)(C).
33. Id. § 1123(a)(5)(I).
34. Id. § 1123(a)(5)(J).
35. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. California, 350 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 1145 (2005). That section describes securities that are exempt from filing, and
securities that are not exempt from filing, and it seems like a lot of bother for Congress to have
engaged in if Section 1123(a)(5)(J) spoke to the matter.
37. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(f)(3), 363(f)(5), and 1129(b).
38. Douglas Baird, Substantive Consolidation Today, 11 (2005), available at www.iiiglobal.org/
country/usa/Substantive Consolidation_5.pdf.
39. In re Bonham, 229 F.3d 750, 763 (9th Cir. 2000); In re Hemenway Transp., Inc., 954 F.2d 1,
12 (1st Cir. 1992); First National Bank of El Dorado v. Giller (In re Giller), 962 F.2d 796, 799
(8th Cir. 1992); Eastgroup Properties v. S. Motel Ass'n Ltd., 935 F.2d 245, 249 (11th Cir. 1991);
Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.), 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987); In
re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988); see Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited,
Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 87 (3d Cir. 2003) (applying bankruptcy "substantive consolidation" rules to
Title VII case).
40. E.g. In re Bonham, 229 F.3d at 763.
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the Bankruptcy Act substantively to consolidate estates of debtors
and nondebtors, and affirmed a bankruptcy court order substantively
consolidating the Chapter 7 estate of the debtor, who had operated a
Ponzi-scheme involving frequent-flyer miles, with that of two nondebtor corporations she used to carry out the fraud. Bonham relied
principally on Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp.,41 advising
that the Supreme Court there "acknowledged" the legitimacy of substantive consolidation.
Sampsell involved a California paperhanger, Downey, whose business had fallen on hard times. Personally indebted to a supplier,
Downey formed a corporation and transferred his goods and supplies
to it, taking stock in return. He also provided cash, which was accounted for as corporate debt. Two years later he was adjudged a
voluntary bankrupt. The corporation was not a bankrupt, but Downey's trustee brought on a proceeding to marshal its assets, and the
referee and reviewing courts upheld pooling the assets of the debtor
Downey and non-debtor corporation. A corporate creditor challenged the consolidation, urging that it had a priority in the corporation's assets. The court rejected the challenge. In effect, it
substantively consolidated debtor and non-debtor estates.
The Court was applying an ancient and familiar rule of law, to be
sure, but the rule was not a rule about consolidating corporations - it
was the Statute of 13 Elizabeth. As Justice Douglas wrote, "in this
case there was a fraudulent conveyance. ' 42 The lower courts found
that the formation of the family-controlled corporation and the transfer to it of Downey's stock in trade was an intentional fraudulent conveyance - the corporation is described melodramatically as a mere
"sham and a cloak." The complaining creditor turns out to have been
a party to the scheme. The Court noted that "consolidation, of course,
does not mean that the order consolidating the estate did, or in the
absence of the [creditor] as a party could, determine what priority, if
any, [the creditor] had to the corporate assets. All questions of fraudulent conveyance aside, creditors of the corporationwould normally be
entitled to satisfy their claims out of corporate assets prior to any participation by the creditors of the stockholder. Such priority, however
would be denied if the corporation's creditors were parties to a fraudulent transfer of the stockholders' assets to the corporation. '43 Douglas sums up: "The power of the bankruptcy court to subordinate
claims or to adjudicate equities arising out of the relationship between
41. 313 U.S. 215 (1941).
42. Id. at 220.
43. Id. (emphasis added).
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the several creditors is complete. '4 4 Taking inventory, then, Sampsell
gives us (i) a garden-variety fraudulent conveyance remedy, (ii) a dictum that runs counter to substantive consolidation, and (iii) a Douglas
flourish. That's... it? That's the Supreme Court's Act jurisprudence
for substantive consolidation? Surely there must be more.
But there isn't more. When we turn to the precedent Justice Douglas saw as relevant, we find no older authorities for consolidation. The
decision cites Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric,45 a case involving the
equitable subordination of the claim - in a single bankruptcy case of a dominant shareholder, Pepper v. Litton;46 the familiar chestnut
treating - in a single bankruptcy case - a judge's power to
subordinate a claim for equitable reasons; and Bird & Sons Sales
Corp. v. Tobin,47 a decision that - once again, in a single bankruptcy
case - a prepetition subordination agreement was enforceable in
bankruptcy. Going still further, we find many variations on the theme
that corporations are creatures of state law, endowed by their state
creators with property rights, which may be altered only by Act of
Congress. 48 What we do not find is a federal judicial power of substantive consolidation.
Manifestly, Sampsell is a fraudulent conveyance decision. When
A's bankruptcy trustee avoids a discrete conveyance to B, A's creditors reach B's property. When, as happened in Sampsell, all of B's
assets are property fraudulently conveyed from A, then pooling B's
assets is simply a remedy in aid of the bankruptcy court's power to
avoid fraudulent transfers. This decision is hardly authority for substantive consolidation of separate persons based on Fish tests, or the
greater good of the people, or "net benefit" to unspecified creditors,
or any of the other themes that have grown up in the literature. In
short, we do not have an ancient jurisprudence under the Act. We do
not have even a single Supreme Court holding. Sampsell has received
false billing. It does not support any notion of an independent equitable power to reshuffle entities that exist under state law. Quite the
contrary, its dictum rejects substantive consolidation.
It was only a generation later that people began to be confused
about this. As Professor Baird notes, the early substantive consolida-

44. Id. at 219.
45.
46.
47.
48.

306 U.S. 307 (1939).
308 U.S. 295 (1939).
78 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1935).
See discussion, infra at § D
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tion all depended either on this kind of fraudulent conveyance, 4 9 or
the underlying state law of veil piercing.5 0
D.

ConstitutionalProblems

The problems run deep. Not only is there no direct authority for a
power of substantive consolidation, there are substantial barriers.
1.

Bankruptcy Power

A general bankruptcy power of substantive consolidation is hard to
square with boundaries the Supreme Court has drawn to limit federal
judicial power to interfere with creditors' rights. "Bankruptcy courts,"
Justice Souter has written, "are not authorized in the name of equity
to make wholesale substitution of underlying law controlling the validity of creditors' entitlements, but are limited to what the Bankruptcy
Code itself provides." 51 The tension between state and federal law is
uneasy, but there is general accord that bankruptcy courts must look
in the first instance to state law for the creation of property interests.
Except where Congress has otherwise determined, property interests
are created and defined by state law, and state laws are suspended by
federal bankruptcy statutes "only to the extent of actual conflict with
52
the system provided by the Bankruptcy Act of Congress."
This proposition is usually heard in describing property of the estate,
but no reason appears why the rule should differ for property of creditors - that is to say, claims. As the Uniform Commercial Code recognizes, "accounts," which are rights to payment of a monetary
obligation, are a form of property.5 3 They may be collateral for an
obligation,5 4 and may be bought and sold. Because claims are as
much a form of property as is property of the estate, the measuring
tape for one should be like that of the other: state law, except where
Congress has spoken, and then according to statute. Congress may
itself create and limit property interests. It may create federal claims
(federal tax claims come to mind) and enact limitations as to state-law
claims, as for example with the cap on rejection damages available to
a landlord under Section 502(b)(6). But short of an Act of Congress,
49. See, e.g., Soviero v. Franklin National Bank of Long Island, 328 F.2d 446, 448 (2d Cir.
1964).
50. See Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940); Stone v. Eachon (In re Tip Top Tailors,
Inc.), 127 F.2d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 1942).
51. Raleigh v. Ill. Dept't of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 24-25 (2000).
52. Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 55 n. 9 (1979); cf. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122;
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827) (contracts as creatures of state law).
53. U.C.C. 9-102(a)(2) (2005).
54. Id. at 9-102(12)(B).
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creditor claims, like estate property, are in the first instance creatures
55
of state law.

Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green illustrates. 56 It involved the effort to collect compound interest, or "interest on interest." The majority held this inconsistent with federal bankruptcy
principles. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result, but only because the interest was uncollectible as a matter of underlying state
law. His analysis bears quoting at length, for it appears to have won
the day with our current Supreme Court.
The business of bankruptcy administration is to determine how existing debts should be satisfied out of the bankrupt's estate so as to
deal fairly with the various creditors. The existence of a debt between the parties to the alleged debtor/creditor relationship is independent of bankruptcy and precedes it. Parties come in a
bankruptcy court with their rights and duties already established,
except insofar as they subsequently arise during the course of bankruptcy administration or as part of its conduct. Obligations to be
satisfied out of the bankrupt's estate thus arise, if at all, out of tort
or contract or other relationship created under applicable law. And
the law that fixes legal consequences to transactions is the law of the
several states... Except for the very limited obligations created by
Congress... a debt is not brought into being by federal law .... The
fact that subsequent to the creation of a debt a party comes into a
bankruptcy court has no relevance to the rules concerning the creation of the obligation ....

If there was no valid claim before bank-

ruptcy, there
is no claim for a bankruptcy court either to recognize
57
or reject.

This, as we will see below, is almost indistinguishable from what Justice Souter has written for modern majorities, and the principle is simply incompatible with substantive consolidation.
A claim is a relationship: a debt of a particular person. This is why
obligations of Mr. Gates are different than obligations of a Chapter 7
debtor; and why obligations of the People's Republic of Bangladesh
trade at different discounts than those of the United States. If a debt
is defined by state law (or Act of Congress), then the identity of the
obligor is also a question for state law. We may illustrate this proposi55. Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161 (1946) ("What claims
of creditors are valid and subsisting obligations . . . is to be determined by reference to state
law."); see Bryant v. Swofford Bros., 214 U.S. 279, 290-91 (1909) ("in bankruptcy the construction and validity of such a contract must be determined by the local laws of the State"); Security
Mortgage Co. v. Powers, 278 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1928); c.f. In re A. Lane Co., 113 B.R. 821, 823
(Bankr. Ma. 1990) (Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code puts a federal standard, beyond state
law, as to what is reasonable).
56. Vanston, 329 U.S. at 169-70.
57. Id.
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tion with several lines of cases. For example, one line discerns impairment under Section 1124 not only where an obligation is modified, but
where the obligor is somehow substituted or modified. "The substitution of a new debtor, although solvent, is a fundamental alteration of a
creditor's rights."5 8
Another line of cases holds that bankruptcy courts lack the power
to overcome a state-court determination that a corporation has been
dissolved as a matter of state law: "How long and upon what terms a
state-created corporation may continue to exist is a matter exclusively
of state power. '59 "The circumstances under which the power shall be
exercised and the extent to which it shall be carried are matters of
state policy."'60 In their different ways, these decisions all illustrate a
common proposition: that the definition of the obligor is as firmly
domiciled in state law as the definition of the obligation. The law that
defines a debt necessarily defines her who owns and him who owes it.
If that law is for states or Congress, not the federal courts, then what
courts cannot achieve by modifying the obligation, they surely cannot
achieve by modifying the obligor.
The modern Court has seized on this theme. "Creditors' entitlements in bankruptcy arise in the first instance from the underlying
substantive law creating the debtor's obligation, subject to any qualifying or contrary provisions of the Bankruptcy Code," the Court
wrote, in deciding that bankruptcy courts are not free to ignore statelaw burdens of proof in deciding claims. 61 To be sure, the courts generally have recognized as "property rights" in creditors only secured
claims, not unsecured claims. 62 Yet the Court has acknowledged limits to the judicial power respecting claims that suggest there are limits
incompatible with power to redefine obligators. "The 'basic federal
rule' in bankruptcy is that state law governs [the substance of
claims]" ' 63 . . . Congress having "generally left the determination of
property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law.' 64 Justice Souter writes, "Congress of course may do what it likes with entitlements in bankruptcy, but there is no sign that Congress meant to
58. Continental Insurance Co. v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corp., 89 F. 2d 333, 336 (5th Cir.
1937); see also Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 691 F. 2d 1039, 1050 (2d Cir.
1982); In re Barrington Oaks Gen. P'ship, 15 B.R. 952, 966 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
59. Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U.S. 305, 312-13 (1891); Ashley v. Ryan, 153
U.S. 436, 441, 443 (1894); New Jersey v. Andersen, 203 U.S. 483, 493 (1906).
60. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Forty-One Thirty-Six Wilcox Bldg Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 127-28
(1937).
61. Raleigh v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000).
62. See, e.g., Bank of New York v. Treco (In re Treco), 240 F.3d 148, 160 (2d Cir. 2001)
63. Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979).
64. Id. at 57.
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alter the burdens of production and persuasion on tax claims. ' 65 As
the Second Circuit put it in Augie/Restivo, where creditors "knowingly
made loans to separate entities and no irremediable commingling of
assets has occurred, a creditor cannot be made to sacrifice the priority
of its claims against its debtor by fiat based on the bankruptcy court's
speculation that it knows the creditor's interests better than does the
66
creditor itself."
Justice Souter summed up this way:
Bankruptcy courts do indeed have some equitable powers to adjust
rights between creditors. See, e.g., § 510(c) (equitable subordination). That is, within the limits of the Code, courts may reorder
distributions from the bankruptcy estate, in whole or in part, for the
sake of treating legitimate claimants to the estate equitably. But the
scope of a bankruptcy court's equitable power must be understood
in the light of the principle of bankruptcy law discussed already, that
the validity of a claim is generally a function of underlying substantive law. Bankruptcy courts are not authorized in the name of equity to make wholesale substitution of underlying law controlling
the validity of creditors' entitlements,
but are limited to what the
67
Bankruptcy Code itself provides.

Again and again, from Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee
to Raleigh to United States v. Noland68 to the echoes in Grupo Mexi69
cano, to the Court's 2004 decision in Lamie v. United States Trustee,
the message from the modern Court is to build remedies with bricks
made by the states and Congress, but not to point with equitable mortar where bricks do not exist.
In sum, since the Constitution does not grant to Congress under the
bankruptcy clause power to take claims, they ought not be taken
through the artifice of shuffling obligors. 70 That is not to say that
Congress cannot enact legislation that limits claims. It does so all the
time. Nor is it a constitutional problem that a claim arising under
state law against Abelco either reaches or does not reach Cain, Inc.
under the governing state law of Abelco's corporate form. But adjusting claims by the whimsical fiat of substantive consolidation, which
lacks a statute and until recently (as we will see below) lacked any
65. Raleigh, 530 U.S. at 21.
66. 860 F.2d 515, 520 (2d Cir. 1988).
67. Raleigh, 530 U.S. at 24-25 (citing United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of
Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 228-29 (1996)).
68. 517 U.S. 535, 543 (1996) (rev'g equitable subordination of tax penalty claims, holding that
the exercise of equitable subordination power may not be "at the level of [a] policy choice at
which Congress itself operated in drafting the Code.").
69. 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004).
70. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 602-603 (1935) (acts of Congress cannot be applied to take away a property right created under state law).
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intelligible rule, raises a problem of constitutional dimension. While
Congress might give courts power to substitute one form of property
for another, as by provision of adequate protection 71 or of "indubitable equivalence, ' 72 and Congress may even decide to subordinate the
right of one form of property (a landlord's claim for breach) to another (a tax claim), a court - particularly a court acting without statutory grant - cannot simply rewrite claims without interfering with
what is, in any practical sense, property.
2.

The Federal Equity Power

If the roots of substantive consolidation doctrine were always in
thin soil, they may have been unearthed by Grupo Mexicano de
Desarrollo,S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 73 which held that a federal court lacked general equitable power to issue a prejudgment injunction against disposition of assets by a defendant. Absent a grant
by Congress, the federal courts have only the equity jurisdiction that
existed in the English Court of Chancery in 1789, when the Judiciary
Act was adopted. Scholars have argued that there is no evidence that
the Chancery Court recognized substantive consolidation. Since the
bankruptcy court is simply a judicial unit of the district court, there is
no equitable power to order the remedy. 74 They urge that the decision broadly indicates that the federal courts lack equitable powers
other than those that existed as of the Judiciary Act and have long
been recognized. We have already seen that substantive consolidation
outside the realm of fraudulent transfers or corporate veil-piercing
rights is a recent construct.
Some authorities disagree with this view. 7 5 Judge Walsh, in the
Stone & Webster decision, found Grupo Mexicano inapplicable because of Justice Scalia's specific reference to bankruptcy power as a
historically equitable power of the district court. 76 But that rather
71. See 11 U.S.C. § § 361, 363(e).
72. See id. § 1129(b)(2)(iii).
73. 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999).
74. See J. Maxwell Tucker, Grupo Mexicano and The Death of Substantive Consolidation, 8
Am.BANKR. INST. L. REV.427, 427 (2000), see also J.Maxwell Tucker, Has the Supreme Court
Eliminated Substantive Consolidation?, 35 No. 23 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP) 3 (April 25, 2000); see
also, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) ("The judicial power created by Art. III § 1, of
the Constitution is not whatever judges choose to do... or even whatever Congress chooses to
assign then,. . .It is the power to act in the manner traditional for English and American
courts.").

75. See In re American Homepatient, Inc., 298 B.R. 152, 164-65 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2003); In
re Stone & Webster, 286 B.R. 532, at 537-40 (Bankr. D. De. 2002) (dicta); In re G-I Holdings,
Inc., 2001 WL 1598178 at *7 (Bankr. D.N.J. April 6, 2001).
76. In re Stone & Webster, 286 B.R. at 537-38.
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begs the question, for we are asking whether substantive consolidation
is a part of that bankruptcy power. Scholarship has turned up no substantive consolidation decisions as of 1789, nor as of 1889. Even
Sampsell in 1941 is nothing more than a fraudulent conveyance case.
This is not the firmly-rooted doctrine to which Justice Scalia was referring. Indeed, substantive consolidation is a doctrine generally applied
to corporations, and in 1789 the American business corporation was in
its cradle. Historians identify only six native-born business corporations that had come into being in colonial times; only twenty more
were added during the thirteen years preceding the adoption of the
federal constitution. 7 7 At the turn of the Eighteenth Century, the idea
remained strange to the Supreme Court: its decisions handled the business corporation with the awkwardness of a bachelor uncle holding
an infant nephew. 78 With the idea of the limited-liability business corporation so novel in 1789, it is not credible to suggest that sophisticated equitable doctrines had yet arisen for merging corporate entities
in insolvencies.
Professor Baird aptly criticizes the Stone & Webster rationale by arguing that substantive consolidation is not a traditional bankruptcy
power at all. He notes an interesting fact. The phrase itself is a parvenu: "substantive consolidation" never appears in the decisions until
1975, the same year in which the remedy at issue in Grupo Mexicano
first appeared. 79 Whatever the reach of its holding, Grupo Mexicano
illustrates a restrictive view of the general equity power of the federal
courts. Justice Scalia quotes Joseph Story (in turn quoting Seldon):
For law we have a measure, and know what to trust to - Equity is
according to the conscience of him, that is Chancellor; and as that is
larger, or narrower, so is Equity. 'T is all one, as if they should
make the standard for measure the Chancellor's foot. What an uncertain measure would this be? One Chancellor has a long foot;
another a short foot; a third an indifferent
foot. It is the same thing
80
with the Chancellor's conscience."
Substantive consolidation interferes with the creditor's claim by
changing the mix of claims at a given entity. It ignores the corporate
form that is to be given effect under state law. It does this without
statutory grant by any legislature - state or federal - and until recently without anything like a predictable judicial rule. It is the mod77. See FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 2.
78. See generally Head Amory v. Providence Insurance Co., 6 U.S. 127 (1804) (formalistic
requirements must be observed to give rise to corporate obligation).
79. See In Re Continental Vending Machine Corp., 517 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1975); Douglas
Baird, supra note 38, at 11-12.
80. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 332-33.
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ern chancellor's foot, out of step with modern Supreme Court
bankruptcy jurisprudence.
IV.

DEFINING AND APPLYING THE DOCTRINE:

WHEN MAY COURTS SUBSTANTIVELY CONSOLIDATE?

A.

Defining a Standard

From a murky past, one proceeds to a murkier present. When may
entities be substantively consolidated? Before August, 2005, no one
could answer this question intelligibly.8 1

The rule is that "[e]ach entity in a [debtor] group must be treated as
separate for purposes of satisfying its creditors. ' 82 But for long years,
courts have defined an exception with platitudes. We were told that
the test was whether "the benefits of consolidation outweigh the harm
to creditors. '8 3 Or whether the "benefits of consolidation outweigh
the economic prejudice ... to creditors. '84 Or whether, "[o]n balance,
consolidation foster[s] a net benefit among all holders of unsecured
claims. ' 85 A hundred more decisions might be arrayed here, all with
variations on this theme.
The "benefits of consolidation" must "outweigh the prejudice to
creditors." In the zero sum of consolidation, creditors of one entity
gain and creditors of the other lose, so what kind of weighing are we
talking about? How taking from Peter to pay Paul is a "net" benefit
to anyone but Paul, and how Paul's gain is to be weighed against Peter's loss - none of this is ever defined. If a mob seizes private property, the beneficiaries may be numerous and hungry, the property
holders few. Does that "outweigh" the prejudice? How numerous?
How hungry? How few? More candid than most, one court admits:
"as to substantive consolidation, precedents are of little value. ' 86
81. To test this assertion, the reader should get hold of a "nonconsolidation opinion" given by
an American law firm in any large commercial financing transaction that predated Owens Corning. Chances are it will exceed 20 pages and fail to contain a rule on which the client may rely.
If it contains plain words setting out to the reader an intelligible rule that reliably will predict the
outcome of cases, then the writer is a genius, or has committed malpractice, or both.
82. See Mirant Mid-Atlantic, LLC v. Morgantown OL1 LLC (In re Mirant Corp.), 327 B.R.
262, 272 (Bankr. N.D. 2005); In re N.S. Garrott & Sons, 63 B.R. 189, 192 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
1986) ("Creditors of the insolvent Eastern Arkansas Printing Company have no legal right to
look to the assets of the solvent N.S. Garrott & sons for payment of their claims."); In re Scholz,
57 B.R. 259, 262 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) ( the creditors of each bankrupt have the right to look
to the assets of each individual estate for satisfaction of the obligations."); See also In re Cash,
1994 Bankr. LEXIS 2059, *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 1994).
83. In re Giller, 962 F.2d 796, 799 (8th Cir. 1992).
84. Eastgroup Properties v. Southern Motel Assoc., 935 F.2d 245, 249 (11th Cir. 1991).
85. In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 954 F. 2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1992).
86. In re Crown Machinery & Welding, Inc., 100 B.R. 25, 27-28 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1989).
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When the informing principle of a "doctrine" was so vacuous, one
could be pretty sure of what was coming: factors. Rather than define
the doctrine, the courts would list factors - preferably lots of factors.
So it went with substantive consolidation. In Fish v. East,87 the Tenth

Circuit promulgated ten:
1. The parent owns all or a majority of the capital stock of the
subsidiary;
2. The parent and subsidiary have common directors or officers;
3. The parent finances the subsidiary;
4. The parent subscribes to all capital stock or otherwise causes its
incorporation;
5. The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital
6. The parent pays salaries or expenses or losses of the subsidiary
7. The subsidiary has substantially no business except with the parent or no assets except those conveyed to it by the parent;
8. The parent refers to the subsidiary as a department or a division;
9. The directors and officers of the subsidiary do not act independently in the interest of the subsidiary but take direction from the
parent; and
10. The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary as a separate
and independent corporation are not observed.
Ten factors are scarcely enough, so the Eleventh Circuit added four
more:
11. Whether the estates were commonly owned;
12. Whether the estates had common officers;
13. Whether the entities had written agreements about the management and operation of the business assets, and specifically whether
funds flowed between the two; and
14. Whether the two entities operated out of the same (central) office and whether any of the employees performed tasks for both
88
companies.
Other cases listed other factors. For example, in In re Vecco Construction Industries the court provides seven factors, 9 and in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., five. 90 Are all factors equal?
How many factors need be satisfied to justify consolidation? Six Fish
Factors? Eight Eastgroups? "Clearly, there is no formulaic
resolution." 91
87. 114 F.2d 177, 191-92 (10th Cir. 1940).
88. Eastgroup Properties,935 F.2d at 250.
89. 4 B.R. 407, 410 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
90. 711 F.2d 1085 (1st Cir. 1983).
91. Heller & Co. v. Langenkamp (In re Tureaud), 59 B.R. 973, 975 (N.D. Okla. 1986); see
generally In re Owens Coming, 419 F.3d 195, 210 (3rd Cir. 2005) ("Too often the factors in a
check list fail to separate the unimportant from the important, or even to set out a standard to
make the attempt.").
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To "factors" courts added another darling of the bench: the hocus
pocus of shifting burdens. One leading decision required first that the
proponent of substantive consolidation show "a substantial identity
between the entities to be consolidated" (common enough with affiliates), and that consolidation is "necessary to avoid some harm or realize some benefit" (broad enough to include all prayers for relief in all
lawsuits filed since Blackstone). At this point, the burden shifted to
the objector, to show that "it relied on the separate credit of one of
'92 It
the entities and that it will be prejudiced by the consolidation.
scarcely need be added that this was all cut from whole cloth. And it
was puzzling. The creditor of the more solvent estate will always be
prejudiced (even if trivially so). As for relying on separate credit, that
is what a contract is: reliance on the counterparty's separate credit.
Did any of this add up to a rule that people could apply? Suppose
we alter the hypothetical. Abelco has only Donald Trump as a creditor. He holds an allowed claim of $100, while Cain, Inc. has 200 hardworking tradespeople holding $1 claims. If we substantively consolidate, one tycoon will be harmed, while 200 working men and women
will be helped. Does that matter? Does it matter that the percentage
gain to the Cain, Inc. creditors is greater than the percentage contribution of Mr. Trump? Before August, 2005, no one knew. So courts said
what they always say when applying a vague principle and random
lists of factors: that they must use a "case by case" analysis, 93 or make
a "searching inquiry, ' 94 or both. 95 In a pinch, resort was made to
96
adverbs.
The bar deserved - and in Owens Corning, at long last got - better than this. Article III of the Constitution requires that every federal
judicial proceeding be a "case by case" inquiry, and every judicial inquiry is searching, or at least we hope so. That judges shall decide the
case before them, and not some other case, and that they shall do so
carefully tells us nothing about what the rule of decision will be.
Owens Corning has taken a step to putting most of this right, but
only in dictum. Before turning to the case, it is well to consider its
progenitor Augie/Restivo, and some of the problems of application
that developed as Court struggled to apply its standard.
92. Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.), 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir.
1987). In a more recent case, the Third Circuit embraced this "test." In re Nesbit, 347 F.3d 72,
86 (3d Cir. 2003).
93. See FDIC v. Colonial Realty Co., 966 F. 2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1992).
94. In re Auto-Train, 810 F.2d at 276.
95. Colonial Realty Co., 966 F. 2d at 61.
96. Eastgroup Properties v. Southern Motel Assoc., 935 F.2d 245, 249 (benefits must heavily
outweigh burdens).
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Augie/Restivo

In the Augie/Restivo decision, the Second Circuit distilled the factors to two 'critical' questions: (1) did the creditors deal with the entities as a single economic unit and not rely on their separate identities
in extending credit to them? and (2) are the economic affairs of the
97
debtors so entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors?
The court reversed an order substantively consolidating two debtors
because creditors of one entity would suffer harm, even though business functions were commingled, the creditors were not deceived, and
the assets themselves were traceable. 98 By contrast, Colonial Realty,
which upheld substantive consolidation, noted a finding that "the witnesses have established the entanglement of these estates and the fact
that creditors generally relied on the three entities when they dealt
with all of them or one of them." 99 There is some hope in this. In this
perplexing corner of the law sometimes the decisions applying the
doctrine are sometimes more sensible than their words.
Hope, yes, but isn't this beginning to sound awfully similar to veilpiercing doctrine? Courts tell us that the law of substantive consolidation is not simply a restatement of the state law of alter ego and veil
piercing, but why not? 100 States propose limited-liability entities and
may dispose of them. Indeed, the older cases seemed to pose the
question whether federal bankruptcy courts could import state rules
regarding the corporate form, concluding that they could. 1 1 Why
their veil-piercing doctrines should have any less force than their rules
for corporate creation does not appear.
97. In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F. 2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988); see In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 723, 763-64 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992). For all of its foolish
dicta, the Ninth Circuit in Bonham actually adopted this test. In re Bonham, 229 F.3d 750, 76667 (9th Cir. 2000).
98. In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d at 519.
99. 966 F.2d 57, 58 (2d Cir. 1992).
100. In re Bonham, 226 B.R. 56, 77 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1998), affd, 229 F. 3d 750 (9th Cir.
2000); see also Reider v. FDIC (In re Reider), 31 F.3d 1102, 1105 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding of
substantially shared identities, a factor for piercing the corporate veil, is only one of the factors
for substantive consolidation); Phar-Mor Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 22 F.3d 1228, 1239 (3rd
Cir. 1994) (drawing distinction between substantive consolidation and piercing the corporate
veil); Colonial Realty Co., 966 F.2d at 61 (substantive consolidation has a "narrower focus" than
veil piercing); J. Stephen Gilbert, Note, Substantive Consolidation in Bankruptcy: A Primer, 43

L. REV. 207, 211 (1990); cf U.S. v. Hoyt, 47 Fed. Appx 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2002) (substantive consolidation allows the bankruptcy court to disregard separate corporate entities to pierce
their corporate veils in the usual metaphor, in order to reach assets for the satisfaction of debts
of a related corporation).
101. Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1942); see generally Trustees System Co. v.
Payne, 65 F.2d 103 (receivers may access veil-piercing rules).
VAND.
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Two overarching elements are required by most jurisdictions to
pierce the corporate veil. There must be such blurring of the lines that
the separate personalities of the entities no longer exist. And the circumstances must show that adherence to separate corporate existence
would sanction a fraud or promote injustice. 10 2 Apart from reversing
the order of the test elements, this articulation does not seem that
different from the rule of Augie/Restivo. "Injustice" is not present
merely because a creditor of a nonconsolidated entity receives less
money than if he held a claim against a consolidated entity. But it
might exist where he had good reason to believe he was dealing with
their collective credit. Entities that mislead the public by ill-capitalized subsidiaries, or observe corporate distinctions as a matter only of
form, are not entitled to the protections of separate liability. Still,
state courts frown on veil piercing as a means to subvert contract
rights or readjust intercreditor rights. 10 3 As one court put it, because
voluntary creditors of corporations are generally able to inspect the
financial structure of a corporation and have the ability to discover
' '10 4
risk of loss, they will receive "little sympathy.
The second factor applied by Augie Restivo is really one of administrative practicality. Suppose that Cain, Inc. has 87 subsidiaries, and
their finances are simply impossible to disentangle. Accounts were
intermingled; bills rendered to one entity were paid by another; no
separate boards were maintained; the boards never met; whom creditors contracted with depended on which box of stationery was put into
the printer. Creditors of the group might rationally conclude either
that they did not, in fact, do business with separate entities, or, more
subtly, that the cost of trying to disentangle and separately treat these
entities is not worth the chance that some may profit by so doing.
Creditors might therefore deem it advantageous to proceed on a consolidated basis. In such a case it might well be that the net savings in
avoided administrative cost is worth even the maximum "give" by a
creditor of the most profitable affiliate.
To illustrate, let us return to Abelco and Cain, Inc., each of which
has $100 in assets. Suppose now that Abelco has 100 creditors holding
$1 in allowed claims, while Cain, Inc. has 105 creditors. Chapter 11
costs of administering each estate would be $10. Absent administrative considerations, substantive consolidation still represents a taking
102. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 41.30; Worth v. Tyler, 276 F.3d 249, 260 (7th Cir.
2001); U.S. v. Cordova Chemical Co. of Michigan, 113 F.3d 572, 580 (6th Cir. 1997); Hystro
Products, Inc. v. MNP Corp., 18 F.3d 1384, 1388-89 (7th Cir. 1994).
103. Southwest Bank of Omaha v. Moritz, 277 N.W.2d 430, 436 (Neb. 1979).
104. Co-Ex Plastics, Inc. v. Alapak, Inc., 536 So.2d 37, 39 (Ala. 1988).
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from Abelco's creditors for the benefit of Cain, Inc.'s, albeit at a trivial scale. But Abelco's creditors would rationally trade the marginally-better return from a separate estate for the $5 in saved
administrative expenses. Left to themselves, Abelco creditors would
receive 90 cents ($100 less $10 in administrative costs divided by 100
claims). Cain, Inc. creditors, left to themselves, recover 85.7 cents
($100 less $10 in administrative costs divided by 105 claims). Substantively consolidated, both sets of creditors receive 92.5 cents ($200 less
$10 in administrative costs divided by 205 claims). Everybody wins.
The richer estate is still the greater giver, but at some level matters are
so close that the net savings in administrative cost can justify
consolidation.
In Augie/Restivo, the court recognized that substantive consolidation should be used "only after it has been determined that all creditors will benefit because untangling is either impossible or so costly as
to consumer the assets. ' 10 5 This seems consistent with Chemical Bank
New York Trust Co. v. Kheel,10 6 in which the Second Circuit approved
a substantive consolidation, but only because the affairs of the debtors
were so "hopelessly obscure" that all creditors would benefit by
avoiding the cost of unsnarling them.
In the rare case such as this, where the interrelationships of the
group are hopelessly obscured and the time and expense necessary
even to attempt to unscramble them so substantial as to threaten
the realization of any net assets for all the creditors, equity is not
approximation of justice to some rather
helpless to reach a rough
107
than deny any to all.
In Nesbit, the court noted, "[m]ore colloquially, the question is
whether the "eggs" - consisting of the ostensibly separate companies
- are so scrambled that we decline to unscramble them."'10 8
This admits of two practical cases. In one, substantial consolidation
is necessary because there is no alternative. No one can tell Cain, Inc.
from Abelco, and no one can distinguish the creditors of one from the
creditors of the other. Under state law, the creditors of either company could pierce the corporate veil to reach the assets of both companies. A bankruptcy court will have no choice.
In the second case, the estates can be disentangled, but only at great
cost. The distinct creditor bodies of each favor - by their votes - treat105. 860 F.2d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1988).
106. 369 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1966).
107. Id. See also Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F. 3d 72, 86 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
124 S. Ct. 1714 (2004) (applying in employment case "factors courts use in deciding when substantively to consolidate two or more entities in the bankruptcy context.").
108. See Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 86.
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ment as consolidated entities. Creditors of Cain, Inc. and Abelco may
agree to take equal dividends and save the administrative costs of litigating prior items. But here, "substantive consolidation" ought not be
a judicial power, but rather an exercise of the creditor franchise,
through plan voting provisions.
C. Problems of Application

Imposition of substantive consolidation presents a number of practical inconsistencies and problems.
1. Interference with voting scheme
In many cases, courts approved substantive consolidation on the
grounds that without it, a plan could not be confirmed. 10 9 One court
put it this way: "One of the policies behind the enactment of Chapter
11 is to give a debtor one meaningful and reasonable chance to rehabilitate. The Court finds substantive consolidation in this case furthers that intent of Congress."' 110 There must be a charm about this
proposition; so far as the writer knows, no Court has put the opposite
and obviously correct one, that Congressional intent is disserved by
substantive consolidation. Congress enacted a list of detailed requirements for the confirmation of plans. It used plain words. "The court
shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are
met.""' It would be hard to express in clearer words a legislative intent that plans not be confirmed unless each and every Code requirement is met. To employ a non-statutory device because the statutory
rules block confirmation is to flout, not to serve, Congressional intent.
The error appears most plainly in the context of voting. One creditor may dominate a class in one affiliate in a jointly-administered case.
Its rejection of the plan will prevent confirmation under 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(8), unless the debtor can meet the cramdown tests of section 1129(b). It is no answer to say that that rejection is grounds to
substantively consolidate the affiliate with affiliated entities, so that
the creditor's vote may be diluted with a more numerous class. The
creditor class of the less solvent debtor will naturally approve treatment that improves its distribution at the expense of the objecting
109. Central Claims Services, Inc. v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. (In re Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.), 192 B.R. 903, 907 (Bankr. S. D. Ohio 1996); In re Manzey Land & Cattle Co., 17 B.R.
332, 338 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1982); In re Murray Indus., Inc., 119 B.R. 820, 832 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1990); In re Munford, Inc., 115 B.R. 390, 396 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990); In re Nite-Lite Inns, 17
B.R. 367, 371 (Bankr. S. D. Cal. 1982).
110. In re Manzey Land & Cattle, 17 B.R. at 338.
111. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2005) (emphasis added).

108

DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:87

creditor's. This approach plainly violates what Congress intended:
that plans of reorganization not be confirmed for that affiliate unless
the statutory tests are met. The Code nowhere suggests that if the
tests are unmet, corporations should be reshuffled in order to meet
them.
There is another way to look at voting, of course, sometimes forgotten by a debtor-friendly bench. Where it is in their interest to do so,
creditors may actually vote, "Yes." Substantive consolidation may be
implemented by vote. That is to say, Cain, Inc. and Abelco's creditors
may agree that it is too expensive to sort out which of them ought to
have a 40-cent, and which a 60-cent, distribution. There may be uncertainties as to intercompany claims. There may be sensible reasons
to treat creditors of different estates the same way. Congress has said
this is appropriate, because it has allowed the accepting vote of an
impaired class to govern the treatment of its members. The point is
that the vote must be conducted debtor-by-debtor, and where the vote
is rejection, that exercise of the creditor franchise should be respected
by the bankruptcy courts. A "no" vote is not an impediment to be
subverted. It is an exercise of the creditor franchise entitled to judicial
respect. The point is that it is for the creditors, not the court, to decline to unscramble the eggs.
2.

Inconsistency with Other Plan Confirmation Rules

Under Section 1129(a)(7), a single objecting creditor, whether part
of an accepting class or not, can scuttle a plan by showing that her
distribution would be better in a liquidation. What happens in substantive consolidation? Must the Section 1129(a)(7) test be met for
the separate estates, or is it enough to satisfy the test in the consolidated estate? In Stone & Webster, Judge Walsh ruled that the test
need be applied solely to the consolidated entity. 1 2 This seems logically correct. If it is sound to consolidate estates for plan confirmation
purposes, then all of the plan tests would seem best applied to the
consolidated debtor. But where consolidation is accomplished on
loose or unpredictable grounds, the doctrine assaults what appears to
be a core Congressional purpose.
Suppose, for example, that Cain, Inc. is out of business, but solvent
- like the debtor in Integrated Telecom Express, Inc.113 It has sufficient cash on hand to satisfy all of its creditors. Abelco, on the other
hand, is insolvent. Suppose further that Bank made an unsecured
112. 286 B.R. 532, 544-45 (D. Del. 2002).
113. 384 F. 3d 108 (3d Cir. 2004).
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loan to Cain, Inc., on the strength of Cain, Inc.'s audited financial
statements. Bank now finds itself in a jurisdiction where a court simply "balances" the "net benefit" to the Abelco creditors of consolidation, finds the prejudice to Bank (a modest haircut on a full payment)
is but a small price to pay for the public good, and consolidates.
Congress left Bank with a lifeline. Under Section 1129(a)(7), it
could call a halt of this confiscation if, on a liquidation, it would fare
better. Whatever bankruptcy may do to state law rights, it cannot
force creditors to restructure debts in a manner that is economically
less attractive than liquidation. With substantive consolidation, that
protection is gone.
3.
a.

Mutant Forms and Other Mischief

The District Court Decision in Owens-Corning

That loose substantive consolidation rules admit of substantial mischief was well illustrated by Judge Fullam's decision in In re Owens
Coming.114 The district judge focused on the operational control
model, common with large consolidated entities, in which planning,
marketing, manufacturing and sales are conducted along a divisional
and product line structure, rather than by separate subsidiaries. Subsidiaries did not have independent management or financial control,
and were established "for the convenience of the parent company, primarily for tax reasons. '115 This model is not unusual, and in the modern corporate group it is often the case that while business is
conducted on a divisional basis, each of the separate subsidiaries is
separately accounted for, that "joint" overhead costs (for lease space
and management, for example) are rationally allocated, and intercompany transfers are accounted for in the company's books and records.
The court noted that "it would be exceedingly difficult to untangle the
financial affairs of the various entities." This seems odd, given that
public audits of Owens Corning were conducted on a regular basis. It
does not appear from the reported decision whether the court's view
arises from a failure to account for intercompany transactions, or from
the alleged difficulty of assessing the fairness of those transactions, but
likely it was the latter. The court notes that intercompany transfers of
cash were made without interest (suggesting that there were reliable
records of the transfers themselves), and that calculations of royalties
are "subject to question" (suggesting that the royalty charges were
identifiable).
114. 316 B.R. 168 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004).
115. Id. at 171.
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The court then considered whether the objecting banks had adequately proved that "they relied upon the separate credit of the subsidiaries." One would think that a suite of separate guaranties and
covenants would settle that question, but, by a neat trick, the court
turned commercial finance on its head. Because the banks obtained
guarantees from all of the entities, it held, they "relied upon the overall credit of the entire Owens Corning enterprise." In other words,
because the banks encumbered the highest and best assets, what they
really wanted was the lowest common denominator. Precisely the opposite is true: the banks obtained guaranties, as any lender does, in
order to access the credit of the most creditworthy obligor. The court
points out that some intercompany guaranties might be voidable as
fraudulent transfers. That may be so, and if it is so (if for example
there was no consideration to the guarantor) the banks would lose the
credit support of the discrete guarantor. But that is hardly grounds to
consolidate all guarantors with the principal. 116 The point is soundly
grasped in Augie/Restivo. Judge Winter's opinion bears quoting at
length:
Creditors who make loans on the basis of the financial status of a
separate entity expect to be able to look to the assets of the particular borrower for satisfaction of that loan. Such lenders structure
their loans according to their expectations regarding that borrower
and do not anticipate either having the assets of a more sound company available in the case of insolvency or having the creditors of a
less sound debtor compete for the borrower's assets. Such expectations create significant equities. Moreover, lenders' expectations
are central to the calculation of interest rates and other terms of
loans, and fulfilling those expectations is therefore important to the
efficiency of credit markets. Such efficiency will be undermined by
imposing substantive consolidation in circumstances
which creditors
1 17
believed they were dealing with separate entities.
b.

Momentary Consolidation

Where Congress writes no rule, an enterprising debtors' bar will
write for it. Substantive consolidation expanded into an even more
mischievous form. In Stone & Webster, Chief Judge Walsh left a
troubling footnote advising that he saw nothing in Section
1123(a)(5)(C) that would limit the consolidations it authorizes to "a
consolidation of corporate entities that outside of bankruptcy could
116. Judge Fullam's decision appears to be driven by an apprehension that the Owens Corning Chapter 11 cases had gone on long enough. The banks, he said, might yet be entitled to
separate treatment in a plan. Id. at 172. He signs off his opinion by saying, "the parties would
be well-advised to settle their differences." Id. at 173. Indeed.
117. In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515, 518-19 (2d Cir. 1988).
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only be structured as provided in the state corporation law. 11 8 Thus a
debtor, the court wrote, might proceed to substantively consolidate
"estates," but not debtor entities. Judge Fullam approved just such a
scheme in Owens Corning. Consolidation would occur only for purposes of "confirmation and consummation of the plan."
If debtors are being consolidated for "plan purposes," but left apart
as separate corporate entities post exit, we have entered a truly lawless realm. This is simply a strategem to avoid taxes and beat the vote
requirements. Nothing in the statutes or the Act decisions supports
such a thing. All pretense - even to intellectual legitimacy - is
gone. If equity requires the collapse of entities, how is it that those
entities are to be turned loose on future creditors as independents?
By collapsing debtors into a larger, weaker consolidated entity for just
long enough to count votes, and then returning the entities to their
previous identity, the debtors swamp the blocking position in dollar
and number that would have existed in at least one of the discrete
entities, and confirm "consensually." The debtors avoid cramdown
requirements and the application of Section 1129(a)(7) to discrete
creditors. Consolidation for "plan purposes" simply takes from creditors a power Congress gave them.
4.

Joint Administration

If a consolidated group files, is it necessary for each debtor to have
its own set of professionals and who should bear the costs? This problem is universally addressed through joint administration orders,
which permit one proceeding (and often one set of professionals) to
administer related cases, 119 but such orders generally proclaim chastely that they should not be deemed to be substantive consolidation.
Like all fig leaves, this one requires us not to look too closely. Who is
attending to the interests of separate corporate entities? In the real
world, demonstrating asset values is not so easy. It may require expert testimony, and that may in turn necessitate separate professionals. Nor does joint administration grapple with how rationally to
allocate administrative expense: A split is not necessarily fair. Suppose Abelco is an energy conglomerate. It has assets of $3 billion and
liabilities of $8 billion. Cain, Inc. is a special purpose subsidiary, cre118. In re Stone & Webster, Inc., 286 B.R. 532, 543 n. 7 (Bankr. D. Del., 2002); see also In re
Giller, 962 F.2d 796, 799 (8th Cir. 1992); see In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 591,
618-20 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (approving "deemed consolidation" that would dissolve upon exit,
without analysis on relative impact on creditors of different estates).
119. See FED. R. BANKR. 1015(a). The Advisory Committee note provides that the
"[clonsolidation, as distinguished from joint administration, is neither authorized nor prohibited
by the rule." Id. at 1015(b) advisory committee's note.
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ated solely for the purpose of owning and operating the Cain, Inc.
plant. Cain, Inc.'s asset, the plant, is worth $500 million, and Cain,
Inc. has liabilities of $600 million. It operates in compliance with regulations through an able contractor. It has reliable sources of fuel
supply and customers for power offtake. None of its creditors agitates
for foreclosure or sale. Margins have tightened in the power industry,
and Cain, Inc. is overleveraged, but left to its own devices, it could
swiftly negotiate and confirm a stand-alone plan; indeed, it likely
could have completed a work-out outside of Chapter 11. Should Cain,
Inc. be allocated 16 percent of the group expenses (on the basis of
asset ratios)? Or 7.5% (comparing liabilities to liabilities)? At either
level, the tradeoff is unlikely to be to Cain, Inc.'s advantage. Abelco
incurs $50 million in professional fees a year.1 20 Should Cain, Inc.'s
creditors be taxed for a share of all this administrative cost?
D.

Owens Coming: the Third Circuit Decision

Earlier this year the Third Circuit issued a significant retrenchment
on the doctrine of substantive consolidation. In In re Owens-Corning,
the Court of Appeals reversed a district court ruling that permitted
the debtors to proceed with confirmation of a plan of reorganization
premised on "deemed consolidation." "Deemed consolidation" is the
absurd mischief that had grown up in Delaware particularly, in which
estates were "consolidated" for purposes of plan confirmation and
then returned to their unconsolidated state for exit. The narrow holding of that case is that such deemed consolidations are unlawful under
the Bankruptcy Code, but the decision contains a broader analysis of
the doctrine of substantive consolidation, and a narrowed restatement
of when it may be applied.
Owens Corning involved a joint filing of a number of affiliated entities. Although there may have been some "sloppy bookkeeping," the
subsidiaries maintained an accounting system reliable enough to permit audits, both pre- and post-petition. 121 A bank syndicate loaned $2
billion and obtained guaranties from solvent subsidiaries. The district
court approved of plan provisions that would have allowed momentary substantive consolidation of the estates - i.e. for long enough to
approve a vote and dilute the banks' distribution - and then permit
120. It has engaged a mega firm as lead counsel, another large national firm as local counsel, a
third firm as conflicts counsel, a fourth as special securities counsel, a fifth as special litigation
counsel. There is a bondholder committee and a creditors' committee and a shareholders' committee; there are a few secured lenders; there is an examiner and a fee-review committee. All
have counsel and local counsel. Six groups of professionals have financial advisors.
121. In re Owens Coming, 419 F.3d 195, 200-01 (3d Cir. 2005).
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the debtors to exit Chapter 11 as separate corporate entities. The
Third Circuit reversed. Its narrow holding is that deemed consolida22
tion is unlawful: "[s]uch deemed schemes we deem not Hoyle.'
The Court said, "what must be proven (absent consent) concerning
the entities for whom substantive consolidation is sought is that (i)
prepetition they disregarded separateness so significantly their creditors relied on the breakdown of entity borders and treated them as
one legal entity, or (ii) postpetition their assets and liabilities are so
scrambled that separating them is prohibitive and hurts all creditors. 1 23 At its core, this decision builds on Augie/Restivo: either the
Debtors' prepetition conduct must have been such as to render corporate separateness a fiction, or it must be practically impossible to disentangle the books. Significantly, the Court excludes any of the vague
"balancing tests" so glibly adopted by other courts, commenting that
''commingling justifies consolidation only when separately accounting
for the assets and liabilities of the distinct entities will reduce the recovery of every creditor.' 24 To apply its rule, the Court sketched out
a new (and somewhat more intelligible) list of five "principles," (not
"factors"):
1. Courts should respect entity separateness absent compelling
circumstances.
2. The harms to be remedied by substantive consolidation must be
those caused by the debtors, not the creditors.
3. Mere benefit to administration is not enough.
4. The remedy should be used rarely and as a last resort.
5. Substantive consolidation might be used defensively "to remedy
the identifiable harms caused by entangled affairs," but not "offensively (for example ... to disadvantage tactically a group
of creditors in the plan process or to alter creditor rights.)."'125
V.

TOWARDS A REDEFINITION OF SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION

By limiting substantive consolidation to more predictable situations,
the Third Circuit has done a great service. But scrutiny of its test
leaves a question: is there anything to this doctrine that is not already
supplied by state law? We are told that a bankruptcy judge may consolidate entities where, during the prepetition period, those entities so
disregarded separateness that their creditors relied on the breakdown
of entity borders and treated them as one legal entity. In this respect
a bankruptcy judge does no more than her state-court counterpart ap122.
123.
124.
125.
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Id.
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Id.
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216.
211.
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plying doctrines of "veil-piercing" that exist in the law of every state.
We then read that a bankruptcy judge may consolidate entities where,
during the postpetition period their assets and liabilities are so scrambled that the cost and difficulty of separating them would hurt even
the creditors of the more valuable estate. This again is no more power
than a state-court judge would have under state law. Future cases will
elucidate the doctrine, but it may well be that the courts will come to
recognize not only that there is no historical legitimacy to "substantive
consolidation," but that, as limited by the Third Circuit, there is simply no need for it.
Substantive Consolidation, to the extent it adds something to statelaw principles of veil piercing and yet is less precise than fraudulent
transfer law, is more confiscatory. Because fraudulent transfer focuses on discrete transactions, courts can, at least in theory, pool back
into an estate those assets - and only those assets - that should
never have left it. This leaves creditor liabilities attaching to the right
groups of assets. Substantive consolidation is rougher justice. Because it pools all assets and liabilities together, then even those that
properly belong to one group of creditors are pooled for the benefit of
all. Suppose, again, using Abelco and Cain, Inc. as an example, two
bond issues. Both are issued by Cain, Inc. (the weaker debtor), but
the first is guaranteed by Abelco and the second is not. The second
issue carries a higher interest rate to reflect the higher risk. If the
estates are substantively consolidated, holders of the first issue lose
the benefit of their bargain - a priority in distress - that they paid
for through lower returns. This proposition can most easily be
demonstrated by institutional debt, but it may play out in subtler
ways, through trade terms afforded Abelco, but not Cain, Inc., higher
pricing, and the like.
Outside the truly consensual context - i.e. where separate accepting votes are obtained from creditor classes of each separate
debtor - substantive consolidation might be reconsidered and addressed solely as a Section 544(a) "superpower" of the hypothetical
lien and judgment creditor. Section 105(a) enables the courts to fashion relief in aid of this broad statutory power, and two kinds of substantive consolidation are immediately evident: substantive
consolidation in aid of fraudulent transfer powers, and substantive
consolidation in aid of the debtor's power as a hypothetical judgment
creditor.
First, in aid of the debtor's power to avoid transfers, a court might
collapse corporate entities where it is shown, as it was in Sampsell,
that all of the property of the transferee derives improperly from the
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transferor. Suppose that Cain, Inc., while insolvent, formed Abelco,
and thereafter from time to time - still being insolvent - transferred
property to it. At the time the two entities filed, all of Abelco's property is either property fraudulently transferred to it by Cain, Inc., or
proceeds thereof. Substantive consolidation is appropriate because it
accomplishes, in a more efficient way, what could be accomplished
through a series of discrete avoidance claims brought under Sections
544 and 548.
By contrast, substantive consolidation would not be available
merely because Cain, Inc. transferred Edenacre to Abelco. The remedy for that fraudulent transfer is avoidance of the transfer itself, not
destruction of the corporate entity. Abelco's creditors have no legitimate claim to Edenacre, but by the same token Cain, Inc.'s creditors
have no legitimate claim to Abelco's other assets.
States propose corporations, and ought to dispose of them as well.
Owens Corning is progress, but no bankruptcy court should be in the
business of defining the persons who appear before it. Bankruptcy
courts should rather apply only those rules written for them by the
state whose law provides the operative rules of corporate creation.

